How to fix: Authentication Tokens Exposed in Page Source
Tokens or session identifiers exposed in the HTML source.
Why it matters
Exposed tokens allow session hijacking.
Authentication tokens should never appear in HTML source. They can be captured by browser extensions, cached by CDNs, or logged by proxies.
How to fix it
- 1Store tokens in HTTP-only Secure cookies.
- 2If tokens must be passed to JavaScript, inject them via a secure API call.
- 3Never pass tokens in URL query parameters.
Code examples
Secure cookie
response.cookies.set('session', token, { httpOnly: true, secure: true, sameSite: 'lax', maxAge: 86400, path: '/' });References
Detected automatically by VulnRadar. The check id is token-exposure, stable across every scan so you can filter or diff on it.
More content checks
- MediumPotential Open Redirect Parameters
- HighDirectory Listing Appears Enabled
- MediumSensitive File References Detected
- HighPotentially Outdated JavaScript Libraries
- Inforobots.txt Present - Review Manually
- InfoCMS / Technology Fingerprinting
- MediumPotentially Dangerous Inline JavaScript
- LowServer version disclosed in response header
Questions
- How severe is Authentication Tokens Exposed in Page Source?
- VulnRadar rates this high severity in the content category. The severity is fixed per check, not scored per site, so the same finding is the same severity on every scan.
- Does VulnRadar check for this automatically?
- Yes. It runs as part of every scan under the check id token-exposure, which stays the same between runs so you can filter, diff, or gate CI on it.
- Which standards does Authentication Tokens Exposed in Page Source map to?
- It maps to CWE-522. In the OWASP Top 10 it falls under A02:2021.
Missing a check?
The detection set is open. If you know a misconfiguration this does not catch, propose it: the issue template asks for the threat model, how to detect it, the false-positive risk, and a test fixture, which is the same thing a maintainer would have to work out anyway.