How to fix: Certificate signed with a broken hash algorithm
A certificate in the chain the server presents is signed with SHA-1, MD5, MD2, or an ECDSA/DSA variant of SHA-1. The scan reads the signature algorithm OID out of the DER of each certificate the server sent, skipping the self-signed root.
Why it matters
A signature over a broken hash can be moved onto a different certificate, because an attacker can construct a second input with the same digest. A forged certificate carrying a genuine CA signature defeats the entire chain of trust, and any client that still accepts the algorithm accepts the forgery without a warning.
Public CAs stopped issuing SHA-1 TLS certificates in 2016 and browsers stopped trusting them in 2017, so a chain still carrying one is a private CA, a very old certificate, or an intermediate that was never rotated. The root's own self-signature is deliberately excluded: a root is trusted by identity rather than by its signature, so SHA-1 there is not a finding.
How to fix it
- 1Reissue the leaf from a CA that signs with SHA-256 or better, and install the full modern chain.
- 2For a private CA, re-sign the intermediate and leaf with SHA-256 and redistribute the root to clients.
- 3Check every intermediate the server sends, not only the leaf: a modern leaf under a SHA-1 intermediate is still a broken chain.
Code examples
Read the algorithm of every certificate served
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
| awk '/BEGIN CERT/,/END CERT/' \
| openssl x509 -noout -subject -issuer -text 2>/dev/null \
| grep -i "signature algorithm"Private CA: sign with SHA-256
openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -CA ca.crt -CAkey ca.key \
-CAcreateserial -out server.crt -days 397 -sha256References
Detected automatically by VulnRadar. The check id is tls-cert-signature-algorithm-weak, stable across every scan so you can filter or diff on it.
More tls checks
Questions
- How severe is Certificate signed with a broken hash algorithm?
- VulnRadar rates this high severity in the tls category. The severity is fixed per check, not scored per site, so the same finding is the same severity on every scan.
- Does VulnRadar check for this automatically?
- Yes. It runs as part of every scan under the check id tls-cert-signature-algorithm-weak, which stays the same between runs so you can filter, diff, or gate CI on it.
- Which standards does Certificate signed with a broken hash algorithm map to?
- It maps to CWE-327. In the OWASP Top 10 it falls under A02:2021.
Missing a check?
The detection set is open. If you know a misconfiguration this does not catch, propose it: the issue template asks for the threat model, how to detect it, the false-positive risk, and a test fixture, which is the same thing a maintainer would have to work out anyway.