How to fix: Timing-Allow-Origin wildcard
Timing-Allow-Origin is set to '*', allowing any origin to read Resource Timing API data exposed via Server-Timing.
Why it matters
Cross-origin pages can fingerprint your backend by reading precise timing data.
When Server-Timing is exposed and Timing-Allow-Origin is '*', any cross-origin page can read the timing entries and fingerprint the origin's backend.
How to fix it
- 1Remove Timing-Allow-Origin unless Server-Timing is intentionally exposed.
- 2If Server-Timing is required, set Timing-Allow-Origin to a specific trusted origin.
Code examples
Nginx
proxy_hide_header Timing-Allow-Origin;Next.js (next.config.mjs)
const nextConfig = {
async headers() {
return [{
source: '/(.*)',
headers: [{ key: 'Timing-Allow-Origin', value: 'https://your-trusted-origin.example' }],
}];
},
};
export default nextConfig;References
Detected automatically by VulnRadar. The check id is timing-allow-origin-wide, stable across every scan so you can filter or diff on it.
More headers checks
Questions
- How severe is Timing-Allow-Origin wildcard?
- VulnRadar rates this low severity in the headers category. The severity is fixed per check, not scored per site, so the same finding is the same severity on every scan.
- Does VulnRadar check for this automatically?
- Yes. It runs as part of every scan under the check id timing-allow-origin-wide, which stays the same between runs so you can filter, diff, or gate CI on it.
- Which standards does Timing-Allow-Origin wildcard map to?
- It maps to CWE-200. In the OWASP Top 10 it falls under A05:2021.
Missing a check?
The detection set is open. If you know a misconfiguration this does not catch, propose it: the issue template asks for the threat model, how to detect it, the false-positive risk, and a test fixture, which is the same thing a maintainer would have to work out anyway.