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HighContentOWASP A03:2021CWE-79

How to fix: DOM XSS Sink or Executable javascript: URI

An inline `<script>` writes a URL-derived value (location, document.URL, document.referrer, or window.name) straight into document.write or innerHTML, or a `javascript:` URI in an href or form target carries a payload that reads cookies or URL data.

Why it matters

A value taken from the URL and written into the page without encoding is executed as markup, so anyone who can get a victim to open a crafted link runs script in that victim's session: reading cookies, calling the site's own API as the logged-in user, or rewriting what the page shows. Because the source is the fragment or the referrer, the payload need never reach the server, which is why this class of XSS survives server-side input filtering and does not appear in access logs.

This is a static read of the delivered HTML. It looks for the two shapes that are dangerous regardless of what the server does: a URL-derived source flowing into a page-rendering sink inside a hand-written inline script, and a javascript: URI whose body touches document.cookie, eval, or URL data. A placeholder href such as javascript:void(0) is not reported, and neither is a bundled script, where a router assigning from location is ordinary framework behaviour.

How to fix it

  1. 1Replace innerHTML and document.write with textContent, or sanitize with a library like DOMPurify before inserting HTML
  2. 2Never pass location.hash, location.search, document.referrer, or window.name into a sink without encoding them first
  3. 3Replace an executable javascript: URI with a real event listener bound in a script file
  4. 4Add a Content-Security-Policy without 'unsafe-inline', which turns a successful injection into a blocked one

Code examples

Read from the URL without creating a sink

JavaScript
// Unsafe: the fragment is parsed as HTML.
el.innerHTML = location.hash.slice(1);

// Safe: the same value, inserted as text.
el.textContent = decodeURIComponent(location.hash.slice(1));

// Safe when markup really is required:
el.innerHTML = DOMPurify.sanitize(decodeURIComponent(location.hash.slice(1)));

References

Detected automatically by VulnRadar. The check id is reflected-input, stable across every scan so you can filter or diff on it.

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Questions

How severe is DOM XSS Sink or Executable javascript: URI?
VulnRadar rates this high severity in the content category. The severity is fixed per check, not scored per site, so the same finding is the same severity on every scan.
Does VulnRadar check for this automatically?
Yes. It runs as part of every scan under the check id reflected-input, which stays the same between runs so you can filter, diff, or gate CI on it.
Which standards does DOM XSS Sink or Executable javascript: URI map to?
It maps to CWE-79. In the OWASP Top 10 it falls under A03:2021.

Missing a check?

The detection set is open. If you know a misconfiguration this does not catch, propose it: the issue template asks for the threat model, how to detect it, the false-positive risk, and a test fixture, which is the same thing a maintainer would have to work out anyway.

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DOM XSS Sink or Executable javascript: URI fix | VulnRadar