How to fix: Frame-busting relies on header only without JS fallback
Clickjacking protection is provided by HTTP header only, without a JavaScript frame-busting script for older browsers.
Why it matters
Older browsers that do not support X-Frame-Options may be tricked into framing the page. While modern browsers all support X-Frame-Options, the JS fallback provides defense in depth for legacy clients.
Combine HTTP header protection with a JavaScript frame-busting snippet for legacy browser coverage.
How to fix it
- 1Keep X-Frame-Options header
- 2Add a JS frame-buster for legacy browsers
- 3Consider CSP frame-ancestors which supersedes X-Frame-Options in modern browsers
Code examples
JS frame buster
// Add to <head> of your page:
if (window.self !== window.top) {
window.top.location = window.self.location;
}References
Detected automatically by VulnRadar. The check id is frame-busting-header-only, stable across every scan so you can filter or diff on it.
More headers checks
Questions
- How severe is Frame-busting relies on header only without JS fallback?
- VulnRadar rates this low severity in the headers category. The severity is fixed per check, not scored per site, so the same finding is the same severity on every scan.
- Does VulnRadar check for this automatically?
- Yes. It runs as part of every scan under the check id frame-busting-header-only, which stays the same between runs so you can filter, diff, or gate CI on it.
- Which standards does Frame-busting relies on header only without JS fallback map to?
- It maps to CWE-1021. In the OWASP Top 10 it falls under A05:2021.
Missing a check?
The detection set is open. If you know a misconfiguration this does not catch, propose it: the issue template asks for the threat model, how to detect it, the false-positive risk, and a test fixture, which is the same thing a maintainer would have to work out anyway.