How to fix: postMessage Sent to Another Window With Wildcard Target Origin
A .postMessage() call targeting another window (contentWindow, opener, parent, top, or a captured event.source) passes the literal string "*" as the targetOrigin argument, so the message is delivered to whatever origin that window currently holds rather than a specific expected origin.
Why it matters
If the target window has since navigated, or was navigated by an attacker (a compromised ad iframe, a clickjacked redirect, a popup the page still holds a reference to), any sensitive data in the message payload is delivered straight to whatever page now occupies that window.
postMessage's second argument restricts delivery to a specific origin. Passing "*" disables that restriction entirely for messages sent to another window: the browser delivers the message regardless of what page currently lives there. This only matters for cross-window sends; a page posting a message to itself (bare window.postMessage or self.postMessage, used by several polyfills to schedule a same-page callback) never leaves the page and carries none of this risk, which is why this check only fires on contentWindow/opener/parent/top/source targets.
How to fix it
- 1Replace "*" with the specific expected origin string (e.g. https://app.example.com).
- 2If the target's origin can vary legitimately, validate it against an allowlist before calling postMessage.
- 3Avoid putting sensitive data (tokens, PII) in postMessage payloads even when targeting a fixed origin.
Code examples
Target a specific origin
// Bad
iframeRef.contentWindow.postMessage(payload, '*');
// Good
const TARGET_ORIGIN = 'https://app.example.com';
iframeRef.contentWindow.postMessage(payload, TARGET_ORIGIN);References
Detected automatically by VulnRadar. The check id is cs-postmessage-wildcard-origin, stable across every scan so you can filter or diff on it.
More client-side checks
- HighCSP Allows 'unsafe-inline' Scripts
- MediumCSP Allows 'unsafe-eval'
- HighpostMessage Without Origin Validation
- HighSensitive Data Stored in localStorage
- HighDOM XSS via location.hash Assignment
- Highdocument.write() in Page Scripts
- Higheval() in Client-Side JavaScript
- MediumExternal Script Without Subresource Integrity
Questions
- How severe is postMessage Sent to Another Window With Wildcard Target Origin?
- VulnRadar rates this medium severity in the client-side category. The severity is fixed per check, not scored per site, so the same finding is the same severity on every scan.
- Does VulnRadar check for this automatically?
- Yes. It runs as part of every scan under the check id cs-postmessage-wildcard-origin, which stays the same between runs so you can filter, diff, or gate CI on it.
- Which standards does postMessage Sent to Another Window With Wildcard Target Origin map to?
- It maps to CWE-346. In the OWASP Top 10 it falls under A05:2021.
Missing a check?
The detection set is open. If you know a misconfiguration this does not catch, propose it: the issue template asks for the threat model, how to detect it, the false-positive risk, and a test fixture, which is the same thing a maintainer would have to work out anyway.