How to fix: Command Injection Parameter Names
Command-related parameter names detected.
Why it matters
Could execute arbitrary OS commands.
Parameters named cmd, exec, etc. may be passed to shell.
How to fix it
- 1Never pass user input to shell commands, use parameterized APIs.
Code examples
Validate and reject shell metacharacters
const SAFE_PATTERN = /^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]+$/;
if (!SAFE_PATTERN.test(userInput)) {
throw new Error("Invalid characters in input");
}
// Then use execFile with argument array, never exec() or shell=trueReferences
Detected automatically by VulnRadar. The check id is command-injection-indicators, stable across every scan so you can filter or diff on it.
More code checks
- CriticalForm Submits Data Over Insecure HTTP
- MediumPotential Prototype Pollution Sinks Detected
- HighPotential Command Injection Vectors
- HighJWT Decoded Without Signature Verification
- HighPotential Path Traversal Vulnerability
- HighInsecure Authentication Mechanisms Detected
- HighPotential Insecure Deserialization
- Mediumeval() Usage in Inline Scripts
Questions
- How severe is Command Injection Parameter Names?
- VulnRadar rates this medium severity in the code category. The severity is fixed per check, not scored per site, so the same finding is the same severity on every scan.
- Does VulnRadar check for this automatically?
- Yes. It runs as part of every scan under the check id command-injection-indicators, which stays the same between runs so you can filter, diff, or gate CI on it.
- Which standards does Command Injection Parameter Names map to?
- It maps to CWE-78. In the OWASP Top 10 it falls under A03:2021.
Missing a check?
The detection set is open. If you know a misconfiguration this does not catch, propose it: the issue template asks for the threat model, how to detect it, the false-positive risk, and a test fixture, which is the same thing a maintainer would have to work out anyway.