How to fix: Stripe publishable key exposed
Stripe publishable keys (pk_live_*) are designed to be client-side. Not a secret.
Why it matters
This is informational
Stripe publishable keys (pk_live_*) are designed to be client-side. Not a secret.
How to fix it
- 1This is informational
Code examples
Stripe publishable key is safe in browser (verify server-side)
// pk_live_* and pk_test_* are intentionally public, used in browser
import { loadStripe } from "@stripe/stripe-js";
const stripe = await loadStripe(process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY!);
// The SECRET key (sk_live_*) must NEVER appear in client code
// Create PaymentIntents server-side only:
// stripe.paymentIntents.create(...): in an API route with the secret keyReferences
Detected automatically by VulnRadar. The check id is code-stripe-publishable-key, stable across every scan so you can filter or diff on it.
More code checks
- CriticalForm Submits Data Over Insecure HTTP
- MediumPotential Prototype Pollution Sinks Detected
- HighPotential Command Injection Vectors
- HighJWT Decoded Without Signature Verification
- HighPotential Path Traversal Vulnerability
- HighInsecure Authentication Mechanisms Detected
- HighPotential Insecure Deserialization
- Mediumeval() Usage in Inline Scripts
Questions
- How severe is Stripe publishable key exposed?
- VulnRadar rates this info severity in the code category. The severity is fixed per check, not scored per site, so the same finding is the same severity on every scan.
- Does VulnRadar check for this automatically?
- Yes. It runs as part of every scan under the check id code-stripe-publishable-key, which stays the same between runs so you can filter, diff, or gate CI on it.
Missing a check?
The detection set is open. If you know a misconfiguration this does not catch, propose it: the issue template asks for the threat model, how to detect it, the false-positive risk, and a test fixture, which is the same thing a maintainer would have to work out anyway.