Host Header & SSRF Scanner
Test how a site handles the Host header and redirects: open redirects, SSRF through the Host header, and the markers that signal a subdomain takeover.
High6Medium6Low1
High6 checks
- Host Header Injection RiskThe response reflects the X-Forwarded-Host header value or appears to use user-supplied host information in links, emails, or redirects. Host header injection allows attackers to poison password reset emails with an attacker-controlled domain.
- HTTP Request Smuggling IndicatorBoth Transfer-Encoding: chunked and Content-Length headers are present in the same response, which is a condition that can enable HTTP request smuggling attacks when a front-end proxy and backend server disagree on which header to use.
- HTTP Basic Authentication Over Non-HTTPSThe WWW-Authenticate: Basic header was found on a response served without HTTPS, or the URL is HTTP. Basic authentication transmits credentials as Base64-encoded plaintext, which is trivially decoded by any network observer.
- Cache Poisoning via Unkeyed HeadersThe response shows cache hit indicators (X-Cache: HIT) while also including or reflecting content from headers that may not be part of the cache key (X-Forwarded-Host, X-Original-URL). This configuration can enable cache poisoning attacks.
- Confirmed Open Redirect via Location HeaderThe scanned URL contained a redirect-style query parameter (next, redirect, url, goto, dest, redir, returnTo, continue, forward, or target) whose value was an absolute URL pointing to an external host, and the response's Location header sent the browser to that exact external host. This is a confirmed match between the request parameter and real server redirect behavior, not a static text guess: the server used the parameter to build the redirect target with no allowlist blocking an off-domain destination.
- Confirmed Open Redirect via Meta RefreshThe scanned URL contained a redirect-style query parameter with an absolute external URL value, and the page's own HTML contains a <meta http-equiv="refresh"> tag whose target matches that same external host. Unlike a server-issued 3xx, this redirect is rendered directly into the page body, so it fires even on a 200 OK response.
Medium6 checks
- Symfony Debug Token Header ExposedThe X-Debug-Token or X-Debug-Token-Link header is present in the response. These headers indicate Symfony's debug profiler is active in production, exposing full request data, database queries, and application internals.
- ASP.NET ViewState Without MAC ProtectionAn ASP.NET ViewState field was found without a corresponding __VIEWSTATEMAC field in the page markup, or with enableViewStateMac explicitly disabled. This check reads the rendered HTML only: a sibling __VIEWSTATEMAC field is one way ASP.NET represents a MAC, but some versions/configurations embed the MAC inside __VIEWSTATE itself instead, which cannot be confirmed without decoding the ViewState payload. Treat the no-sibling-field case as needing manual verification rather than a confirmed vulnerability; an explicit enableViewStateMac="false" in the markup is a confirmed misconfiguration.
- Webhook/Callback URL Configured to a Private AddressA JSON response field or HTML form field named with 'webhook' or 'callback' is currently set to a URL whose host is a private IP range (RFC 1918), loopback, link-local address (including the 169.254.169.254 cloud metadata endpoint), or a .local/.internal/.lan name. The field's live value, not just source code, is exposed in the response.
- Webhook URL From Request Passed to Outbound Call UnvalidatedSource text in the response shows a webhook/callback URL variable assigned directly from request input (req.body, req.query, req.params, or similar) and passed to an outbound HTTP client (fetch, axios, got, superagent, request) shortly after, with no private-IP or allowlist validation keyword found anywhere between the two.
- URL-Import Field From Request Passed to Outbound Call UnvalidatedSource text in the response shows a URL-import field (avatar/image/logo-by-URL, link-preview/unfurl, or PDF/export-from-URL) assigned directly from request input (req.body, req.query, req.params, or similar) and passed to an outbound HTTP client (fetch, axios, got, superagent, request) shortly after, with no private-IP or allowlist validation keyword found anywhere between the two.
- OAuth Authorization Request Missing State ParameterA request made to an OAuth/OIDC authorize endpoint during the scan has both response_type and client_id in its query string (confirming it's a real authorization request, not just a page whose path happens to contain "authorize") but no state parameter. Without a state value the client generates and later verifies, the authorization flow has no CSRF protection.
About the Host validation checks
- What does the Host validation category check?
- Test how a site handles the Host header and redirects: open redirects, SSRF through the Host header, and the markers that signal a subdomain takeover. Open redirects, SSRF through the Host header, subdomain takeover markers.
- How many host validation checks are there?
- VulnRadar runs 13 checks in this category, ranging across high, medium, low severity.
- Do I need to install anything to run the host validation checks?
- No. Paste a URL in the browser or call the REST API, and the scan itself runs from our servers against that URL. There is no agent and no appliance to deploy alongside your application. A browser extension exists if you want to scan the page you are looking at, but nothing has to be installed to use this.
Run the host validation checks on your site
VulnRadar runs all 13 of these against a URL in seconds, with the evidence and fix for every finding. No agent to install, just paste a URL.