Email Security Scanner
Measure a domain's email spoofing surface: MX records, SMTP TLS, and whether SPF, DKIM, and DMARC actually align rather than just existing.
High3Medium17Low13Info4
High3 checks
- SPF Exceeds 10 DNS Lookup LimitThe SPF record triggers more than 10 DNS lookups during evaluation. RFC 7208 mandates a maximum of 10 DNS lookups; exceeding this causes a permerror, causing SPF to fail for all messages.
- SPF Redirect LoopThe SPF record contains a redirect= modifier that creates a circular reference back to the original domain, causing infinite recursion and a permerror.
- SPF Record Uses +all (Explicitly Permits Any Sender)The SPF record's terminal mechanism is +all (or has no all mechanism and defaults permissively), which explicitly authorizes every server on the Internet to send mail as this domain. This is stronger, and worse, than simply omitting -all: it is an affirmative statement that any sender is allowed, not just the absence of a restriction.
Medium17 checks
- DMARC Aggregate Report URI (rua=) MissingThe DMARC record does not include an rua= tag. Without aggregate reports, you have no visibility into how receivers are handling mail from your domain, and you cannot see if your legitimate mail is failing authentication.
- MTA-STS (SMTP Strict Transport Security)Async check: probes _mta-sts.<domain> for a v=STSv1 TXT record and reports its mode= value. Policy-file reachability at mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt is verified separately by the email-mta-sts-policy-missing check.
- DMARC Policy Set to Monitor-Only (p=none)A DMARC record exists for this domain, but its p= tag is set to "none". Receivers apply no enforcement action to mail that fails DMARC; failing messages are delivered exactly as if no DMARC record existed at all, with reports (if configured) as the only effect.
- MTA-STS Policy File MissingAn MTA-STS TXT record exists but the policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt is not reachable. Without the policy file, the MTA-STS declaration has no effect.
- MTA-STS Mode Not EnforcingThe MTA-STS policy is set to mode: none or mode: testing. These modes do not enforce TLS for inbound SMTP connections, so STARTTLS downgrade attacks remain possible.
- MX Hostname Is a CNAME (RFC Violation)An MX record points to a hostname that is a CNAME alias rather than an A/AAAA record. RFC 5321 explicitly prohibits MX targets from being CNAME records.
- SPF Record (Sender Policy Framework)No SPF record was found at the domain apex. SPF is one of three email authentication mechanisms (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) that prevent unauthorized senders from sending mail as your domain.
- DMARC Record MissingNo DMARC record exists at _dmarc.<domain>. Without DMARC, there is no policy telling receivers what to do with mail that fails SPF or DKIM authentication, and you receive no reports about authentication failures.
- DMARC Subdomain Policy Weaker Than Domain PolicyThe DMARC record includes an sp= tag whose policy (none/quarantine/reject) is weaker than the p= tag governing the organizational domain itself. Subdomains fall back to the weaker sp= policy instead of inheriting the stronger domain-wide policy.
- DKIM Public Key Uses a Weak RSA Key SizeA DKIM selector was found publishing an RSA public key below 2048 bits. Keys under 1024 bits are treated as a high-severity finding since they are within range of practical factoring attacks; keys from 1024 up to 2047 bits are deprecated but not immediately breakable.
- Multiple SPF records publishedThe domain publishes more than one TXT record beginning with v=spf1, which RFC 7208 forbids. Exactly one is allowed, and a domain with two or more is a permanent error.
- SPF include target publishes no SPF recordAn include: mechanism names a domain that resolves but publishes no v=spf1 TXT record. That makes the whole SPF evaluation a permanent error, not just the one mechanism.
- Multiple DMARC records publishedThe _dmarc subdomain returns more than one TXT record beginning with v=DMARC1. RFC 7489 section 6.6.3 says a receiver that finds more than one must apply no DMARC policy at all.
- DMARC reports sent to an external domain that has not authorized themDMARC reports are addressed to a different domain that has not authorized receiving them. RFC 7489 section 7.1 requires the destination to publish an authorization record before a receiver will send cross-domain reports.
- DKIM selector restricted to the SHA-1 hash algorithmA DKIM selector record declares h=sha1 and offers no sha256 alternative alongside it. Signatures under that key are restricted to the rsa-sha1 algorithm.
- MX record points at an IP address instead of a hostnameAn MX record names an IP address literal as its exchange, which the standards forbid. RFC 1035 and RFC 2181 require the exchange to be a domain name that has an address record.
- MTA-STS policy does not cover every published MX hostThe fetched MTA-STS policy file lists mx patterns that do not match one or more of the domain's published MX hostnames.
Low13 checks
- DMARC Forensic Report URI (ruf=) MissingThe DMARC record does not include a ruf= tag specifying a forensic report URI. Forensic reports contain message samples from emails that fail DMARC, which are invaluable for diagnosing spoofing attempts.
- TLS-RPT Record Missing rua= Reporting URIAsync check: a v=TLSRPTv1 TXT record exists at _smtp._tls.<domain>, but it has no rua= tag specifying where to send reports. Without rua=, the record has no effect.
- DMARC pct= Below 100The DMARC record specifies pct= less than 100, meaning the declared policy (quarantine or reject) is only applied to a percentage of failing messages. The remainder are delivered as if no DMARC policy exists.
- MTA-STS Policy ID Not RotatedThe MTA-STS id= field has not changed, meaning previously cached policies may not be invalidated when the policy changes. Sending servers cache MTA-STS policies for up to max_age seconds.
- DKIM Record MissingNo DKIM public key record was found for this domain. DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) cryptographically signs outgoing messages, allowing receivers to verify the signature has not been tampered with.
- SPF Uses Deprecated ptr: MechanismThe SPF record uses the ptr: mechanism. RFC 7208 explicitly deprecates ptr: because it triggers expensive and unreliable reverse DNS lookups that slow SPF evaluation and may cause timeouts.
- BIMI Logo URL Does Not Meet BIMI RequirementsA BIMI record exists at default._bimi.<domain>, but its logo location (l=) tag is malformed, not served over HTTPS, or points at a non-SVG image file. Mail providers that support BIMI (Gmail, Yahoo, Fastmail, Apple Mail) will not display the brand logo when this happens.
- SPF record has no all mechanismThe SPF record ends without an all mechanism and without a redirect modifier. Any sender not matched by an earlier mechanism therefore gets the default result, neutral.
- SPF redirect modifier ignored because all is presentThe SPF record contains both an all mechanism and a redirect= modifier, so the redirect is dead. RFC 7208 section 6.1 says redirect is ignored whenever an all mechanism is present.
- DMARC aggregate report address is not a valid URIThe rua tag on the DMARC record contains an entry that is not a usable reporting URI. RFC 7489 requires each entry to be a URI, in practice mailto: or https:.
- DKIM selector published in testing modeA DKIM selector record carries the t=y flag, which marks the domain as still testing DKIM. It tells receivers not to treat a verification failure any differently from unsigned mail.
- DKIM selector published with an empty (revoked) keyA DKIM selector record has an empty p= tag, which RFC 6376 defines as a revoked key. Every signature made with that selector therefore fails verification.
- MTA-STS policy max_age shorter than one weekThe fetched MTA-STS policy file sets max_age below 604800 seconds, one week. RFC 8461 recommends at least that long for a policy in enforce mode.
Info4 checks
- DNSSEC Not EnabledDNSSEC is not enabled for this domain's DNS zone. Without DNSSEC, DNS responses can be forged by cache poisoning attacks, redirecting email to attacker-controlled servers.
- TLS-RPT Record MissingNo TLS-RPT record exists at _smtp._tls.<domain>. TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is a companion to MTA-STS that receives aggregate reports about SMTP TLS negotiation failures.
- SPF record uses macro expansionThe SPF record contains a macro expansion, which builds a DNS name out of the incoming message. Parts such as the sender's local part or the client IP are substituted into a name that is then queried.
- BIMI record publishes a logo with no verified mark certificateThe BIMI record at default._bimi publishes a logo URL but carries no a= tag. Without an a= tag there is no Verified Mark Certificate backing the logo.
About the Email checks
- What does the Email category check?
- Measure a domain's email spoofing surface: MX records, SMTP TLS, and whether SPF, DKIM, and DMARC actually align rather than just existing. MX records, SMTP TLS, SPF alignment, spoofing surface area.
- How many email checks are there?
- VulnRadar runs 37 checks in this category, ranging across high, medium, low, info severity.
- Do I need to install anything to run the email checks?
- No. Paste a URL in the browser or call the REST API, and the scan itself runs from our servers against that URL. There is no agent and no appliance to deploy alongside your application. A browser extension exists if you want to scan the page you are looking at, but nothing has to be installed to use this.
Run the email checks on your site
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