Server Configuration Scanner
Fingerprint the server banner and framework, and find the configuration leaks that hand an attacker a map: exposed debug endpoints, verbose version strings, and default routes.
Critical2High3Medium5Low5Info9
Critical2 checks
- Raw .env File Content ServedThe response body looks like raw .env file content (APP_DEBUG/APP_KEY/DB_PASSWORD-style KEY=VALUE lines) rather than rendered application output.
- Spring Boot H2 Database Console ReachableThe Spring Boot H2 in-memory/file database web console is reachable, providing direct SQL query access to the application's database.
High3 checks
- Debug Toolbar Active on Public PageDjango Debug Toolbar or Laravel Debugbar/PHP Debug Bar static assets were found referenced in a publicly reachable page.
- Raw Apache .htaccess File ServedThe response body looks like a raw Apache .htaccess file (RewriteEngine/Options/<Files> directives) being served as a document instead of being processed as server configuration.
- phpMyAdmin Login Page Publicly ReachableThe phpMyAdmin login page renders directly for unauthenticated requests, with no network-level access restriction in front of it.
Medium5 checks
- No Rate-Limit Policy DetectedNo rate-limiting headers (X-RateLimit-Limit, RateLimit-Limit, Retry-After) or a 429 response were observed. Without rate-limiting, brute-force, credential stuffing, and scraping attacks can run unchecked.
- Vary: Cookie Missing on Cookie-Bearing ResponseThe response sets cookies but does not include a Vary: Cookie header, and the response is not marked Cache-Control: no-store/no-cache/private. A shared cache (CDN, reverse proxy) that stores this response may serve one user's cookie-gated content to a different user requesting the same URL. Static assets are not reported: their bytes are identical for every visitor, and Vary: Cookie on one is itself a defect (see vary-cookie-on-static-resource).
- CORS Endpoint Missing Vary: OriginAn endpoint returns a dynamic Access-Control-Allow-Origin header (reflecting the request's Origin) without including Vary: Origin. Caches that store this response may serve one origin's response to a different origin.
- Debug Mode Toggled via CookieA cookie named debug=true (or similar) was detected that enables debug behavior in the application. Debug cookies are an easy way for an attacker to trigger verbose error output, disable security checks, or access debug endpoints.
- Next.js Development Build Running in ProductionThe response contains Next.js development-mode build artifacts ('development-mode _next/static paths' paths or a 'development' buildId), indicating the app is running 'next dev' instead of a production build.
Low5 checks
- Set-Cookie Header Exceeds 4 KBA Set-Cookie header is larger than 4 KB. Browsers silently drop cookies that exceed this limit, causing unpredictable session behavior.
- Vary Header Missing on Compressed ResponsesA compressed response (Content-Encoding: gzip/br) is missing the Vary: Accept-Encoding header. Without it, a shared cache can serve a compressed response to a client that does not support compression. A response marked Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache or private is not reported, since no shared cache may store it in the first place.
- Server-Timing Exposes Cache TimingsServer-Timing values such as cache;dur=12 or edge;dur=4 expose internal cache hit/miss timing to the client and to any cross-origin page with a Timing-Allow-Origin grant.
- Vary: Cookie on Static ResourceA static asset (image, JS, CSS) is served with Vary: Cookie. This forces shared caches to store a separate copy for each unique cookie value, defeating caching entirely for that asset.
- Server-Timing Exposed Without Timing-Allow-Origin GateServer-Timing is exposed publicly without a Timing-Allow-Origin restriction, allowing any cross-origin page to read performance data.
Info9 checks
- Downloadable Content Served as inlinePDFs, Office documents, or other downloadable files are served with Content-Disposition: inline, causing them to render in the browser rather than download. Inline rendering exposes them to iframe-based data exfiltration.
- X-XSS-Protection Header Is DeprecatedX-XSS-Protection is set to '1; mode=block'. The browser XSS auditor this header controlled has been removed from Chrome/Edge and was never supported in Firefox. The header is obsolete.
- X-Amz-Cf-Id CloudFront Request ID ExposedThe X-Amz-Cf-Id header exposes an AWS CloudFront request identifier on every response, confirming that CloudFront is in use and leaking request correlation IDs.
- X-Vercel-Cache Reveals Edge Cache StateVercel's X-Vercel-Cache header exposes HIT/MISS/BYPASS/PRERENDER status on every response, confirming Vercel infrastructure usage.
- X-Nextjs-Cache Reveals Next.js ISR Cache StateNext.js sets X-Nextjs-Cache: HIT | MISS | STALE | BYPASS to indicate ISR/SSG cache state. This leaks framework architecture details to any client.
- X-Netlify-Cache Exposes CDN Cache StateNetlify's X-Netlify-Cache header exposes HIT/MISS/PASS/REVALIDATE cache status on responses, confirming Netlify infrastructure usage.
- X-Cache-Hits Exposes Cache Hit CountSome CDNs (Cloudflare, Fastly) include X-Cache-Hits to indicate how many times an asset was served from cache. This leaks traffic patterns and caching topology.
- Vary Header Missing User-Agent on UA-Dependent ResponsesA response appears to vary by User-Agent (e.g., serving different HTML to mobile vs. desktop) but does not include Vary: User-Agent. Caches may serve the wrong variant to the wrong device.
- CF-Cache-Status Exposes Cloudflare Cache StateThe CF-Cache-Status header (HIT/MISS/DYNAMIC/BYPASS/EXPIRED/REVALIDATED) is present on responses, confirming Cloudflare usage and revealing edge cache behavior.
About the Config checks
- What does the Config category check?
- Fingerprint the server banner and framework, and find the configuration leaks that hand an attacker a map: exposed debug endpoints, verbose version strings, and default routes. Server banner, framework fingerprint, exposed debug endpoints.
- How many config checks are there?
- VulnRadar runs 24 checks in this category, ranging across critical, high, medium, low, info severity.
- Do I need to install anything to run the config checks?
- No. Paste a URL in the browser or call the REST API, and the scan itself runs from our servers against that URL. There is no agent and no appliance to deploy alongside your application. A browser extension exists if you want to scan the page you are looking at, but nothing has to be installed to use this.
Run the config checks on your site
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